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I. INTRODUCTION
It is ultimately, if not immediately, mysterious that American jurispru-
dence generally recognizes no constitutionally fundamental property rights,
good as against the government. Generally, there is no distinctively prop-
erty-based right or interest of which the holder may be deprived only upon
a showing of a compelling state interest, coupled with a showing that the
measure or action depriving the owner of her property is narrowly tailored
to effectuate the measure's purpose.' This Article refers to several reasons
why this may be so, but its central purpose is to specify at least a narrow
but potentially significant class of property rights, indentifiable at reasona-
ble cost in the judicial setting, that clearly merits the special protection
accorded fundamental rights.2 To throw this narrow class into sharp relief,
we will consider the legitimacy of their compensated but nonconsensual tak-
ing under the government's eminent domain power based on the current
permissive case law, and from a perspective that draws upon the substance
and methodology of less accomodating, and ultimately convincing, contem-
porary and classical legal philosophy.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
I. For a broad overview of the case law developing and imposing this "strict scrutiny"
test in the context of fundamental rights, see generally 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & J.
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986). See also Lupu, Untangling the Strands
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981 (1979).
2. The notion of fundamental property rights is used here for its obvious linkages to
certain constitutionally recognized fundamental liberty rights and to certain strands of legal
and moral philosophy, but other terminology is possible. Given, for example, the Calabresi and
Melamed framework of property rules, liability rules, and inalienability, our thesis is simply
that there are at least some property rights that should be protected by property rules. See
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). On their schema, property rules require transfer
by means of a voluntary transaction. Id. at 1092. Calabresi and Melamed correctly cite a
typical eminent domain situation as invoking the protection of a liability rule, under which fair
or objectively determined compensation must be offered, but the owner's consent need not be
obtained, as opposed to a property rule. Id. at 1092-93. See also Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabil-
ity and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 932 (1985).
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The argument herein is intended to avoid dependence on any particu-
larly controversial understanding of the term "property." Some have de-
spaired, understandably, of a fully satisfactory definition of property in re-
lated contexts.3 For our purposes, though, there is no obvious harm in
assuming, unless otherwise indicated, even the "vulgar and untechnical
sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises rights
recognized by law ... '"
No one would doubt, for example, the presence of a property right
issue of some sort if a putative condemnee objected to a state's plan to take
his treasured, heavily annotated high school yearbook for shredding and use
in repairing an expanding leak in a publicly-owned dam, despite an admit-
tedly legitimate public use or purpose in repairing the dam and an admit-
tedly generous, well above fair market value, offer of compensation to the
putative condemnee.
On the merits of this thankfully rather contrived example, of course,
the courts generally would certainly hold for the condemning authority, all
else equal, and all procedural requirements complied with, as against the
owner's protestations as to the obvious availability of equally serviceable
dam-fill material, in the market or by condemnation, with no distressing
psychological consequences for any condemnee.
Even if we sense no injustice or property rights violation in the year-
book condemnation, it should be borne in mind that this example falls only
in the midrange of potentially disturbing cases. Least disturbing, for our
purposes, are mere uncompensated pecuniary expenses incurred by the con-
demnee.5 Into a middle range category would fall a variety of generally
uncompensated psychic losses associated with broadly "personal," sentimen-
tal, emotional or related injuries, including the loss or disruption of merely
3. See, e.g., Humbach, A Unifying Theory For the Just Compensation Cases: Tak-
ings, Regulation and Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 245 (1982). For one analysis, see
Dowling, General Propositions and Concrete Cases: The Search For a Standard in the Con-
flict Between Individual Property Rights and the Social Interest, 1 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 353 (1985).
4. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945). Further, the
examples discussed will almost invariably fall within what Bruce Ackerman has called "so-
cial," or generally obvious, property, as opposed to "legal" property, recognizable only by the
legal specialist. See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 116-23
(1977); Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's Private
Property and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 57 (1979).
S. See, e.g., Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 432 & 432 n.1 11 (1983) (citing 4A P. NiCHOt.s, EMINENT DOMAIN §
14.2471, at 14-284.1 to -335 (rev. 3d ed. 1976)).
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settled or familiar patterns, routines, objects, or social relationships.6
Potentially most disturbing, though, are instances in which a proposed
condemnation would jeopardize or undermine the condemnee's very identity
or self-image, the material basis of her self-respect, core personality, or
long-term life plans or their meaning. Not all grievous, emotionally wrench-
ing losses or dislocations necessarily fall into this category; a sentimental
loss can be psychically devestating without calling one's basic self-concep-
tion or identity into question. The latter sort of loss may occur as a result of
non-consensual takings, however generously compensated, that take insuffi-
cient account of our practice of infusing our personality into tangible or
intangible objects in such a way that our creative transformation of the
object becomes itself a process of self-construction, of the creation and
transformation of our own identity, of the development of our own basic
personality.
There is of course no clear and sharp division between losses of the
second type, of "merely personal" losses, and of the third type, of "identity
losses." There is perhaps a difference between the two categories generally
in the degree of conscious creative transformation of object or of self in-
tended. One may develop mere "attachments" to persons, objects, and
places through a largely random or inadvertent process, but one may also
seek to transform both self and object through certain property relation-
ships. At least some minimal percentage of hobbies, avocations, small (or
large) businesses, or obsessions, along with their material requisites, must
fall into this third category.
The third category, of identity-constitutive property rights, will be
elaborated throughout this Article. It will be argued that at least some such
rights should be recognized as constitutionally fundamental. Immediately,
though, we recognize one reason why they are typically not so recognized:
the potential profundity of certain property relationships is hardly hinted at
by the most widely circulated analyses of the concept, which focus rather
bloodlessly on such incidents as "possession" and "use." 7
At least some third category property right situations may also create
actual conceptual anomalies. It might be supposed, for example, that there
is a moral or legal principle of the additivity or conservation of rights or
entitlements to a piece of property; that the rights, say, of four subsequent
6. See, e.g., Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 432 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Waldron, What is Private Property, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 336
(1985) (citing Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest ed.
1961)); Snare, The Concept of Property, 9 AM. PHIL. Q. 200 (1972) (property as involving
rights of use, exclusion, and transfer as well as rules relating to punishment, damages, and
liability).
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owners of the property must in a sense be neither more nor less than those
of its sole prior owner. But this view may lead to disturbing results, once
the possibility of property inseparable from identity is admitted.
Consider a case in which each of a huge number of us has taken off a
bit of time to make a vanishingly small contribution to, and thereby ac-
quired a vanishingly small, but protectable, legal interest in, an Easter Is-
land-type sculpture under construction. It seems doubtful that for all pur-
poses, our property rights in the sculpture should, additively, equal those of
a solitary individual sculptor who has utterly invested, transformed, and
created his basic personality and self-definition through his life's work devo-
tion to a physically identical sculpture.8 The devoted solitary sculptor may
have a qualitatively different relationship with his property than those of a
plethora of dilettante sculptors. As we shall see below, the law should re-
spect this difference in at least some cases.
In the meantime, it must be recognized that identity destruction is in
an important sense simply non-compensable in pecuniary terms; an utterly
different self, an unchosen person is the recipient of any financial compen-
sation for this kind of loss. Scrupulously compensating such a condemnee
for lost fair market value, inconvenience, costs of relocation or litigation,
and so forth cannot begin to make the condemnee whole, or indifferent as to
her pre-condemnation and post-compensation states, as she is, by hypothe-
sis, not the same subject, against her will. Still less can it credibly, or even
meaningfully, be said to such a condemnee that over the long term, perhaps
through legislative logrolling, the benefits and burdens of the institution of
eminent domain will tend to balance out.9
Ordinarily, when we recognize an impending grievous loss and the in-
adequacy of money damages to compensate the injured party, we at least
consider the possibility of injunctive relief.10 This is of course not ordinarily
done in condemnation cases once the legitimacy of the public use or pur-
pose of the taking is conceded, despite .the apparent recognition of the law
that homeowners, for example, may not be indifferent as between retention
of their homes and monetary compensation for losses incurred through
condemnation."1
8. Cf. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 57-58 (1985).
9. See Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 561, 583-85 (1984) (citing Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J.
145, 156-57 (1977-78)).
10. See. e.g., Scott v. Jordan, 99 N.M. 567, 573, 661 P.2d 59, 65 (App. 1983) (citing
New Castle Orthopedic Associates v. Burns, 481 Pa. 460, 392 A.2d 1383 (1978); Gregory v.
Sanders, 635 P.2d 795 (Wyo. 1981)).
II. Consider the policy logic of "substitute condemnation" as discussed in Berger, The
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Of course, it must be admitted that not all takings of vital, identity-
constructive property will utterly destroy the property's identity-value for
its owner. There may clearly be a difference for, say, a Frank Lloyd Wright
as to whether his own home is condemned as a sort of living museum, or
condemned in order to be razed for a highway. Similarly, it is possible, if
less likely, for a mere police power regulation to substantially impair, if not
utterly destroy, an object's identity-value, if a single vital use of that prop-
erty is prohibited, even if the property continues to exist in form. As a gen-
eral rule, though, regulation will normally be preferred to condemnation by
our third category owners, and it is perverse from their standpoint to en-
courage takings over regulation by holding the former less enjoinable, on
the theory that the fifth amendment's just compensation clause," or a com-
parable state constitutional provision,'3 affords the sole remedy.
Finally, it is entirely possible that any fundamental property rights we
detect may, at least in rare circumstances, be trumped in practice by a
condemnor's showing of a compelling governmental net interest in the con-
demnation and the absence of any feasible alternative less burdensome
courses of state action. While it is difficult to tell from the opinion and even
from the commentary, it is possible that the well-known case of Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit" may qualify as a rare instance of
the conjunction of a compelling state interest in at least the prospect of
substantial urban employment effects with the absence of available alterna-
tives less burdensome to any identity-constructive rights that might be de-
tected in the massive community dislocation required to prepare the tract
for General Motors.' 5
Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 219-20 (1978) (citing
Pitznogle v. Western Md. Ry., 119 Md. 673, 87 A. 917 (1913)).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. See I P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.1 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed.
1976).
14. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (per curiam).
15. See id. But see the opinion of Ryan, J., dissenting in id., and the uneasy, if not
skeptical, commentary such as Note,
Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409
(1983). The difference in result between cases such as Poletown on the one hand and In re
Petition of City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981) (en banc), in which a
municipal improvement project was held not to constitute a public use, may lie not so much in
the difference in formal constitutional standards applied to the taking, but in the relatively
greater employment-conscious panic evinced in Poletown. For a strong expression of the im-
portance of community-based values in this context, see Bender, The Takings Clause: Princi-
ples or Politics, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 735, 826 (1985).
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II. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LIBERTY RIGHTS
It is important both to recognize the relevant similarities between, as
well as to differentiate, constitutional rights to property and to liberty,
whether deemed fundamental or not. Neither sort of right need be charac-
terized or defended as natural or non-contractual."6 Similarly, just as it
would be absurd to ask, in a constitutional context, whether there is a
broad, general, fundamental right to liberty, simpliciter, so it would be un-
reasonable to imagine a correspondingly broad fundamental right to prop-
erty. There are instead certain narrow, specifiable fundamental liberty
rights recognized in particular contexts; 7 similar recognition may be ac-
corded similarly limited fundamental property rights.
Importantly, it should not be simply assumed that whatever claim any
property right may have to constitutionally fundamental status utterly de-
pends for its cogency on whatever contribution the property right in ques-
tion may make to the preservation of liberty."8 The constitutionally cogniza-
ble value of property rights is not simply derivative of the value of liberty
rights.
Liberty and property, and their corresponding rights, clearly cannot be
defined in terms of each other. Even avoiding strict and precise, and there-
fore suspect, definitions of either, it seems uncontroversial that liberty, at
least in its constitutionally more familiar "negative" sense,19 is essentially a
matter of the range or number of available alternative choices or actions
and their value, whether such options are ever determinately exercised or
not." Property, on the other hand, at least in our central cases, involves a
determinate, if changeable relation between the owning subject and the
owned tangible or intangible object, with the focus of analysis on the actual,
as opposed to merely available option of, use, enjoyment, or contemplation
of the object, along with the actual greater or lesser creation or transforma-
tion of both the object and the owning subject.
To put the point in a somewhat different way, it is clear that even if
the use or transformation of a given item of property in a specified, particu-
16. Cf. Christman, Can Ownership be Justified by Natural Rights, 15 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 156, 156, 160 (1986). See also Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 230 (1985).
17. Consider the scope of the fundamental liberty right of interstate travel apparently
recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) as apparently narrowed in the con-
text of divorce, as opposed to welfare eligibility, residency requirements in Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975).
18. This claim is made most recently in Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A
Final Requiem for the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
388, 396 (1985).
19. See 1. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969).
20. See MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 PHIL. REV. 321 (1976).
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lar way were compulsory-either physically compelled, or required with the
threat of punitive sanctions for disobedience-and hence plainly not a mat-
ter of liberty or freedom of choice, the property or property relationship
could still be intact and of substantial value to the owning subject. The"meaningfulness" of the property, or the property relationship, to the owner
is therefore not a function of the owner's liberty."1
The inconsistency, or mutual supportiveness, between private property
and various basic liberties has been mooted by writers as diverse as Herbert
Spencer and Karl Marx. It may suffice for our purposes to note that while
there are doubtless certain tensions between private property rights gener-
ally and certain basic political freedoms,"2 at a general level, the constitu-
tional framers more broadly assumed a more sanguine view. 3 The narrow
fundamental property rights argued for in this Article seem, on balance,
inseparable from and supportive of any plausible, valued set of basic liber-
ties. They are not generally inconsistent with some elements of social or
collective property ownership, with the recognition of welfare rights en-
forceable at law, or with broad-based, principled programs of redistribution
of income or wealth. Nor do they mandate such institutions, at least with-
out further argument not attempted here. 4
The distinguishability and separate functioning of property and liberty
rights does not mean that notable takings will not potentially impinge on
both sorts of rights. The Poletown3 circumstances, involving the severance
of neighborhood friendships and long associations, may have involved ele-
ments of both. This suggests, rightly, that while there is a certain concep-
tual logic and economy to fixing whatever is wrong with takings doctrine
through a property rights approach, liberty-based partial solutions may also
21. Professor Humbach attempts to draw a consistent distinction between two sorts of
property interests, the right to the forebearance of others, and the freedom to use and enjoy.
Humbach, A Unifying Theory For the Just Compensation Clause: Takings, Regulation and
Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 253 (1982). Even if such a distinction is tenable, it is
clear that the sorts of property interests of central concern to us cut across this dimension.
22. See, e.g., R. FLATHMAN, THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS 199-230 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 710 (1985) (discussing the Madisonian
conception).
24. It is sometimes argued that the institution of eminent domain is in practice biased
against the poor and the powerless. See, e.g., Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Do-
main: History and Policy, I I ENVTL. L. I, 48 (1980). This, despite the plausible assumption
that the economic costs of organization and collective action would normally be low. It may
then be of particular moment to note that the fundamental property rights view argued for
herein cannot usefully be characterized as narrowly biased or of value only to the middle class.
The most impecunious of peasants may utterly invest himself in, and conceive of his productive
life largely in terms of, his modest plot of land, the taking of which, even with compensation,
would be identity-threatening.
25. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981) (per curiam).
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be possible.2
III. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO A FUNDAMENTAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ANALYSIS
It is readily maintainable that a fundamental property right analysis is
dependent for its coherence and force on some sort of notion of personality,
and that "the notion of personality is too vague to enable us to deduce
definite legal consequences by means of it." ' While it might be replied that
the indicia of a fundamental liberty, as opposed to property, right are not
themselves luminously clear, and that even once identified, fundamental lib-
erty rights do not by themselves permit definite legal inferences, there is
certainly some appeal in this objection.
A full response must await the remainder of the argument below. In
the meantime, it can simply be observed that in a practical or literal sense
of the term "fundamental," our personality is ordinarily susceptible to hier-
archical analysis. Our liking the color blue is a part of our personality that
is ordinarily not as profoundly important or self-definitive as our relation-
ship with our spouse or home, which may, or may not, also constitute as-
pects of our personality. Some aspects of personality are, upon reflection,
recognizably closer to the core than others, in part because of the depth and
richness of their implications. If forced to choose, we would not consider all
aspects of our personality equally central and equally worth retaining. We
would be "lost" without certain aspects of our personality, 8 and quite un-
moved by the loss of others.
It is also possible to argue that any fundamental property rights de-
tected will either be too narrow to be of general interest, or too broad to be
credible as trumps to most ordinary putative takings. One suspects that to a
properly placed holder, even a remarkably narrow fundamental right is of
substantial interest. How broadly a fundamental right should be extended,
or how narrowly constricted, can be generally guided by the theory devel-
oped below, but is perhaps ultimately best resolved incrementally, through
case law development. 9
It may also be argued that the more plainly central to personal identity
26. See Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem for the Public
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain?, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 388, 399 (1985) (citing, most
notably, the very judicious article by Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34
STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)).
27. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 18 (1927).
28. See, e.g., Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 223, 241-42 (1985).
29. Compare the comparable elaboration and narrowing process of the fundamental
right of interstate travel noted supra note 17.
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a particular property relation becomes, the greater the risk that the prop-
erty relation becomes a destructive attachment, obsession, fetish, monoma-
nia, or addiction of some sort.30 Presumably, one is reluctant to characterize
such relationships as healthy, let alone as deserving of strict scrutiny pro-
tection. While the risk is perhaps real, it is undeniable that most typical
obsessions, e.g., with drugs, say, or with making money for its own sake, do
not involve a single object subject to taking. The drugs to be prized and
consumed, or the money to be made, today is physically distinct from that
to be prized, consumed, or made tomorrow. A taking of today's money or
drugs is not destructive of the owner's identity, as in our central cases. It is
also clear that not all instances of identity-constitutive property relation-
ships are plausibly characterized as pathological, or as indicative of mis-
placed priorities, or of indifference to other people. Persons may be devoted,
as well as obsessed. Hearing that Louis Pasteur's laboratory had burned to
the ground would have inspired sympathy, not relief at the perhaps un-
avoidably abrupt lifting of Pasteur's "obsession."
Retreating a bit, the practical argument may be made that even if a
narrow fundamental property right were detectable in the abstract, judicial
recognition of such a right is simply not worth the administrative costs of
sorting and filtering the claims that would inevitably arise. For practical
reasons, therefore, it would be prudent to deny judicially what we know
philosophically.
One obvious accomodation of this objection is to assume that narrowly
defined rights will tend to draw appropriately limited numbers of serious,
not merely pro forma, claimants. The costs and delays and other eviden-
tiary problems associated with vindicating any claim of fundamental right
can presumably be reduced by relying mainly on obvious, cheaply accessi-
ble, objective proxies of the underlying, admittedly ineffable subjective
states of mind. Reasonably objective, if not documentary, evidence should
be normally available of such matters as length of residence, time normally
spent doing a particular thing, and so forth. While such matters as the
availability of alternative, less fundamental right-burdening courses of gov-
ernment action may require the use of the discovery process, such standard
practical problems do not seem unduly burdensome when balanced against
the value of preserving rights that, by hypothesis, are deemed of crucial
practical importance, quite apart from the explicit, indisputable recognition
of property rights in the text of the Constitution itself.
One might also be wary of recognizing any fundamental property
rights in the eminent domain context, for fear of creating incentives to so-
30. One is reminded of the Marxist tradition of "commodity fetishism". See also J.
ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected
Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 762 (1986).
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cially wasteful strategic behavior. Hold-out or other strategic behavior is of
course endemic in the eminent domain context generally.31
However, it would seem precisely the area of central concern to us, in
which a person has infused her personality into property and defined and
created that personality through that property, that is least subject to stra-
tegic manipulation. Our central case, at least on its own terms, could not be
further removed from strategic behavior."2 As well, one does not apparently
or actually devote oneself to an object in the hope or more or less soundly
based expectation that the government will, after a long passage of time,
normally, condemn the object, merely so that the owner can block the tak-
ing, on the assumption that a court would give him the extra negotiating
leverage of a fundamental right. There are simply easier, quicker, surer
ways to make as much money.
Finally, it may be argued that to accord to a right status as constitu-
tionally fundamental is to assert its universal value and appeal, and that a
system of enforceable private property rights lacks this quality. It has been
noted, for example, that "from the perspective of a hunting people . . .
definite property in land may seem undesirable and indeed may cause inse-
curity."33 It is less clear whether such hunters are equally put off by the
notion of private property in hunting knives or other tools of the trade. In
any event, there is an obvious breadth of appeal in contemporary American
jurisprudence for at least some minimal recognition of some set of private
property rights, and if it is true that no system of even narrowly circum-
scribed fundamental property rights will lack for detractors, this is at least
equally true of, say, our fundamental right to choose which, if any, religious
tenents to believe, in the general absence of state inducements.
IV. RAWLS AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY
At some risk of condemnation for engaging in a painstaking, conscien-
tious Lochnerizations4 of the matter, this section makes one of a variety of
possible affirmative philosophical cases for a constitutionally fundamental
property right.
While John Rawls of course does not purport to be doing contitutional
31. See, e.g., Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain, I I ENVTL. L. I, 52
(1980); Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203
(1978); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 165 (1974).
32. Cf. T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF DECISION (1960).
33. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 86 n.55 (1985)
(emphasis in the original).
34. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See also Kelso, Substantive Due
Process As a Limit On Police Power Regulatory Takings, 20 WILLAMETTE L.J. 1, 18 (1984).
[Vol. 21
PROPERTY RIGHTS
theory directly, 5 and while on Rawls' theory such matters as "the question
of private property in the means of production . . . are not settled at the
level of the first principles of justice . . . ,"" Rawls is quite explicit that
constitutional law must apply and accord with the principles of justice se-
lected in his Rawlsian original position.3"
Certainly, there are substantial information constraints on the rational
contractors behind Rawls' veil of ignorance. 8 What they do know, however,
is sufficient to allow them to choose principles, or further refinements or
specific interpretations of those principles, that bind constitutional drafters
to recognize what amounts, in essence, to at least some narrow fundamental
property right.8 9
Even at the stage of the very notion of veil bargaining or discussion,
the foundations for a fundamental property right begin to emerge. The no-
tion of actual or hypothetical bargaining, based on rational individual inter-
est, itself logically presumes a reasonably strong continuity of identity or
basic personality over extended periods of time in society, otherwise the
point or advantage in choosing one particular package of rights and rights
limitations over another fades dramatically. If the self that one is choosing
moral principles for is too ephemeral, plastic, or oceanic in identity, the
point and possibility of rationally preferring one set of moral arrangements
dissipates. At least some sort of set of enforceable property rights is neces-
sary if the self is to be guaranteed an anchoring in society.
The general features of the principles of justice that emerge from be-
hind the veil are well-known and will not be rehearsed here.40 It must suf-
fice to say that the "equal basic liberties" that Rawls views as absolute,
secure, and inviolable 4' under ordinary circumstances include, among
others, "the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person
. . . and . . . the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law."' 2 Of
35. See Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 1017 (1973).
36. Rawls, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in 3 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 53 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982) (hereinafter cited as Basic Liberties).
37. Id. at 55.
38. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-37 (1971).
39. The veil parties are disabled from knowing social facts that illicitly bias their
choice of principles, but they are presumed to know "the general facts about human society.
They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of
social organization and the laws of human psychology." Id. at 137.
40. For a recent authoritative restatement, see Basic Liberties, supra note 36, at 5. A
statement of Rawls' earlier formulation is also contained in Michelman, In Pursuit of Consti-
tutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962,
970 n.23 (1973).
41. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 160-61 (1971).
42. Basic Liberties, supra note 36, at 5.
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course, these sets of rights will tend to overlap substantially, generally and
in our context in particular.
Rawls explicitly notes that his formulation does not recognize or attri-
bute weight to any general right to liberty.' 3 The concept of a liberty right
must be differentiated and subdivided. Similarly, it is important in our con-
text to focus not on some global right to property generally, which must be
easily overrideable if it exists at all, but on the logical role and value of
more specifically formulated property rights.
Rawls then specifies that "among the basic liberties of the person is the
right to hold and to have the exclusive use of personal property.""" He ex-
plains that "the role of this liberty is to allow a sufficient material basis for
a sense of personal independence and self-respect, both of which are essen-
tial for the development and exercise of the moral powers.' 4 5 Self-respect is
important further in that "it provides a secure sense of our own value, a
firm conviction that our determinate conception of the good is worth carry-
ing out. Without self-respect nothing may seem worth doing, and if some
things have value for us, we lack the will to pursue them."' 46
It is an essential feature of Rawls' basic liberties in general, whatever
their implications for property rights, and of the basic liberty, in Rawls'
terminology, to hold and exclusively use personal property in particular,
that they receive what Rawls terms "lexical" priority, or that they "have an
absolute weight with respect to reasons of public good and of perfectionist
values.' 7 This means simply that whatever the possible conflicts among the
basic liberties-and it seems reasonable to assume that genuine conflicts
between identity-constitutive property relations and the exercise of other
basic liberties will be rare-the Rawlsian right to personal property cannot
be subject to overruling or involuntary tradeoff for the sake of mere public
purposes, values, or goods, as on some sort of utilitarian calculus.
Even pre-analytically, then, it is clear that Rawls' theory of justice is
incompatible with familiar eminent domain principles under which a taking
of private property, vital or not, need be justified only by reference to some
reason of state or collective good. 4 8
Equally important, the Rawlsian basic liberties apart from property
43. Id.
44. Id. at 12.
45. Id. Rawls refers in id. at 16 to the two moral powers of a capacity for a sense of
right and justice, and the capacity for a conception of the good.
46. Id. at 33.
47. Id. at 8.
48. See, most prominently, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), but more restrictive formulations of the public use
requirement also tend to fall afoul of Rawlsian principles.
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rights also implicate and necessitate the similarly absolute protection of at
least a narrow class of basic property rights. For example, on Rawls' analy-
sis, the function of freedom of conscience and association is to permit the
individual's "forming, revising, and rationally pursuing a conception of the
good over a complete life."'4  A person behind Rawls' veil of ignorance
would recognize that if at least some profound property relationships are
not appropriately protected from violation, with or without monetary com-
pensation, her ability to form and pursue a variety of eligible life plans
would be jeopardized and set at needless, unacceptable risk.
More generally, to the extent that persons cannot engage in personality
construction and development through the creation and transformation of
property and use of such property itself over time, there is correspondingly
little point to most other political liberties, arrangements, or guarantees
that persons could arrange via any sort of social contract.
The essential value of at least a narrow fundamental right to property
also emerges through Rawls' discussion of the so-called primary goods.
Rawls argues that "a person's good is determined by what is for him the
most rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favorable circum-
stances. A man is happy when he is more or less successfully in the way of
carrying out this plan." 5 0 Persons behind the veil of ignorance must recog-
nize that weakening the legal protections accorded what we have referred to
as identity-constitutive property relations is far more likely to risk and jeop-
ardize whatever long-term plans they may develop, risking and jeopardizing
thereby their own happiness, than it is to contribute to their fulfillment.
Rawls refers more specifically to the social bases of self-respect as a
kind of primary good." The social bases of self-respect include "those as-
pects of basic institutions normally essential if citizens are to have a lively
sense of their own worth as persons and to be able to develop and exercise
their moral powers and to advance their aims and ends with confidence."52
49. Basic Liberties, supra note 36, at 50. Rawls' theory at this point could be used to
give coherence not only to textually based fundamental constitutional rights to property, but to
non-textual fundamental rights to personal privacy. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). There is at least some sort of
relationship between privacy and property at its deepest level. Even such illiberal horrors as a
compulsory government arranged, random-pairing marriage loses much of its power to appall
if the parties to such a union have not had much opportunity to engage in self-definition, or
whose identities are in permanent flux. Property is probably essential to the process of self-
definition, at least for most of us. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 51 (T.
Knox ed. 1965).
50. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92-93 (1971). See also Basic Liberties, supra
note 36, at 21-23.
51. See, e.g., Basic Liberties, supra note 36, at 23.
52. Id. It may be noted parenthetically that while Rawls often couches his argument in
terms of groups, classes, or "representative persons," his argument in this context applies with
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Again, the persons behind the veil, not knowing whether they will be ascetic
saints or not during their lives, cannot gamble that they can somehow at-
tain self-respect in the absence of as strong a protection of vital property
rights as is compatible with other fundamental concerns. There are no obvi-
ous recurring conflicts among Rawlsian primary goods such as to suggest
the desirability of leaving the protection of vital property interests to a
merely utilitarian calculus, or some other modest standard. 53
As Rawls points out, self-respect is ordinarily dependent upon the re-
spect that other persons bear for us.54 Further, conceptions of justice"should publicly express men's respect for one another." 55 Respect for
others, or the course of treating them as autonomous ends in themselves,
and not merely as means, requires more than even a conscientious utilita-
rian calculation of the loss of life-meaning that some condemnations may
threaten.
In the central, identity-constitutive property cases, the crucial un-
Kantianism,56 or unfairness, or exploitation, which cannot be erased by
showering the condemnee with compensation, inheres not so much in the
disproportionality of the burden imposed upon one or a few condemnees,
but in the implicit denial of the condemnee's basic identity, the contempt
for her basic life-choices, and in the assumption of the essential meaning-
lessness of the condemnee's life, or the condemnee's lack of capacity to in-
vest her life with the meaning derived from the property in question. 57
equal force to individual persons.
53. While it is quite possible that two persons could construct their identities through
the same piece of property in ultimately incompatible ways, the exercise of eminent domain
rarely pits crucial identity values on opposite sides of the condemnation. The point of condem-
nation is of course typically to demolish or radically transform the particular property. Cf.
Baker, Property and its Relation to Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 762 (1986).
Similarly, while identity-constitutive property may be of immense social value in some incom-
patible alternative use that does not rise to the level of a compelling state interest, the con-
demnor must still pay full market value of the property's highest and best use on any theory.
Cf. id. For a condensed account of the Rawlsian primary goods and their functions, see Basic
Liberties supra note 36, at 22-23. For the crucial character of self-respect, see Michelman, In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA.
L. REV. 962, 977 (1973).
54. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 178 (1971).
55. Id. at 179.
56. The possible bearing of Kantian ethical principles on certain aspects of broader
takings problems is discussed in B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1977); Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's Private
Property and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1979).
57. This is not to suggest that rational actors would never trade off any self-definitive
property, e.g., one's extensive, self-acquired butterfly collection, for other primary goods, such
as income and wealth, at any rate. Of course, immense amounts of merely fungible money
may allow one to begin the renovation of one's identity with alacrity. There are no fundamen-
tal rights, including the right to address political issues, that rational persons would never
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Rawls also emphasizes the importance, in choosing among possible
moral principles, of the stability of the conception of justice involved, as
opposed, for example, to the probable strains of compliance or adherence
that commitment to the principle would involve." One important factor
contributing to stability is that the principles selected be "rooted not in
abnegation but in affirmation of our person."59 It is precisely in our iden-
tity-constitutive property cases that rational contractors would most want to
"insure themselves against the worst eventualities,"60 and under moral prin-
ciples recognizing or requiring a fundamental property right, "they run no
chance of having to acquiesce ' 'el in the disruption of their identity, with or
without compensation, "for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by
others .. ." A fundamental property right rule, suitably drawn, with
recognition of the possibility of a genuinely compelling state interest, im-
poses less commitment strain than our current, almost unconstrained tak-
ings rules.
Our excursion through Rawlsian moral philosophy is not dependent for
its value on a theory that it is generally appropriate to inject widely
respected moral and legal philosophy into the Constitution.63 That the
framers of the Constitution placed great importance on the protection of
property rights is textual and undeniable. A literal reading of the Fifth
Amendment establishes only that the drafters contemplated some kinds of
takings a. 6 The proposition that property can be taken for public use only if
compensation is paid is not logically equivalent to a permissive view that all
kinds of property, regardless of the nature of the relation between owner
and object, can be taken for any public use. The Fifth Amendment, by
itself, does not answer questions of the fundamental right status of at least
some property relationships. Moral philosophy may help answer questions
such as whether the framers could reasonably have concluded that in cer-
voluntarily exchange, in some measure, for the sake of a fortune. There are limits, though, and
much tighter limits on such exchanges when involuntary.
58. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 176-77 (1971); Basic Liberties, supra
note 36, at 31-32.
59. Basic Liberties, supra note 36, at 31.
60. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 176 (1971).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. For a sampling of some of the most interesting work in the past decade on modes of
constitutional interpretation, see J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); Brest, The
Misconceived Quest For the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Simon,
The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justi-
fied?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482 (1985); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353 (1981); Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Consti-
tutional "'Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551 (1985); Schauer, An Essay on Constitu-
tional Language, 29 UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982).
64. See, e.g., G.R.G. MURE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 165 (1965).
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tain specifiable takings situations, no compensation could be "just" or
appropriate.
The support for a fundamental right to property that can be drawn
from Rawls' theory does not depend, further, on some idiosyncratic Rawl-
sian value preferences. We might, as a potentially illuminating, if somewhat
daunting, thought experiment, try to imagine someone with Hegel's under-
standing of the general facts of society behind Rawls' veil of ignorance.
Hegel understood property as the right to acquire and own, possess and
use, by putting one's socially respected will into, external objects such as
mere things and animals without rational wills of their own. On Hegel's
view, "property is the embodiment of personality . 6..",5 At least in cases
where such embodiment is unusually profound, sacrifice of personality ap-
proaches sacrifice of the person, and there is no obvious reason to counte-
nance this except upon a compelling state interest.
On the relationship between property and the "social bases of self-re-
spect," it is apparent that Hegel's thought parallels the lines ascribed above
to Rawls. "Through property man's existence is recognized by others, since
the respect others show to his property by not trespassing on it reflects their
acceptance of him as a person."6
For Hegel, property has not only an instrumental function, which
might be served by mere money or just compensation; as well "it is a basic
requisite for man in his struggle for recognition and realization in the objec-
tive world .... ,,67 For Hegel, for Rawls, and for this Article, the crucial
moral dimension of property is not the act of laboring itself, or marking off
the object as one's own, or deserving the object, but the nature and func-
tions of the relation between owner and object. 68 On Rawls' theory, and for
someone with a Hegelian understanding of society behind Rawls' veil of
65. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 51 (T. Knox ed. 1965) (emphasis in the
original). See also S. AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 136 (1972); Still-
man, Property, Freedom and Individuality in Political Thought, in XXII NoMos: PROPERTY
132 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980).
66. S. AVINERI, HEGEL'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 136 (1972).
67. Id. at 135. Of course, for Hegel, individual private property rights belong to the
sphere of what Hegel calls Abstract Right, which is transformed and incorporated into the
higher stages of morality and ethical life. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
addition to § 46 (T. Knox ed. 1965); id. at X (translator's forword). This does not mean that
private property rights wither before reasons of state, however. One commentator has observed
that "the absolute right of the state, which may call on its citizens to die for it, can in ordinary
circumstances no more abrogate private property than any other individual liberty." G.R.G.
MURE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 165 n.2 (1965).
68. It has been said that "the attractions of Hegel's development of the concept of
property depend on our everyday feelings about our need to identify with and express ourselves
in things we make, control and use." A. RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 131
(1984).
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ignorance, it is incumbent that at least the most vital, identity-constitutive
sorts of property relations receive moral and constitutional protection
equivalent to that normally accorded fundamental rights on a strict scrutiny
analysis.
V. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND CURRENT THINKING ON
PROPERTY RIGHTS
The historic American tendency has been to regard the right to prop-
erty, generally, as at least in some sense fundamental,6" but to generally
permit incursions or limitations imposed by any positive law. 70 This
amounts more to an antinomy than to a consensus.7 1
It is clear on the one hand, again, as a general rule, that
Despite the inclusion of the takings clause in the Bill of Rights,
the Court, as part of its reaction to Lochnerism, has relegated
property rights to second-class status by classifying measures af-
fecting them as economic legislation entitled to a close to insu-
perable presumption of constitutional validity.7"
This view tends to rely not only on a distinction between personal and prop-
erty rights, but on the assumption "that all property rights may be treated
alike."73
On the other hand, it has been suggested that "we are entering a...
phase ... in which substantive constitutional content will once again be
given to property rights .... ,,71 Proponents of this approach have plausibly
suggested that property rights are not simply a reflection of class-based ide-
ology and that the dichotomy between personal and property rights is
false.7 5 They have not, however, provided a satisfactory explanation of why
69. See, e.g., Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467 (1976). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison)(J.
Cooke ed. 1961).
70. Both sides of this antinomy are represented in Blackstone. See Burns, Blackstone's
Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 67, 77 (1985).
71. Professor John Costonis has observed that "while the conception of property rights
nurtured by William Blackstone, Adam Smith and John Locke is now suspect, no firm consen-
sus has yet crystallized to take its place." Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accomoda-
tion Power: Antidotes For the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1021, 1025 (1975).
72. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model For the Taking
Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 476 (1983).
73. Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 428 (1983).
74. Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV.
583, 597 (1981).
75. See, e.g., Justice Stewart's opinion in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S.
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not all property rights should be treated as of a piece constitutionally.
One reason given for the apparent trend toward increasing respect for
property rights, at least in some contexts, is, logically enough, the allegedly
decreasing utility derived from the industrial or other development in virtue
of which individual or neighborhood-based property rights are overriden.7 6
It may be disputable that there is some fixed stock of environmental or
scenic amenities that is unequivocally reduced by development, or that the
economic value of a new shopping center is less than in former times, but
this is irrelevant if cultural values are in fact changing in the way indicated.
Professor Sax has speculated along these lines that "it may be that as
growth and development seem to become less valuable guides for future
well-being, those things that speak to sustenance, continuity, adaptation
and evolutionary change rise sharply in value."' 7 Certainly, the exercise of
eminent domain is most usually the enemy of continuity; it is when eminent
domain impinges on the most vital sorts of continuity, as of identity or core
personality, as in some takings of multi-generationally held family business
premises, that eminent domain requires the most vigorous restriction.
Ultimately, the most illuminating question may be not whether prop-
erty is rising in importance relative to collective developmental interests,
but whether, among the multiple justifications for property rights, those
that suggest a fundamental right status for some property rights are rising
in importance relative to those that do not.
Among the latter are the familiar utilitarian incentive arguments. On
the assumption that "no man will sow where another will reap . . . ,,78 it
has been observed that "[tihe theory that stable property expectations are
necessary for productivity pervades legal doctrine. 79
On the incentive-based arguments, there is no need for any sort of fun-
damental right status; people may well still be inclined to behave produc-
tively if they believe that they have merely a high probability of enjoying
the fruits of their labors. Equally importantly, the incentive-based argu-
ments for property rights seem adequately accomodated by even a liberal
takings regime, as long as there is something like a just compensation
clause requiring payment to the condemnee. At the level of a broad and
538, 552 (1972).
76. See Sax, Some Thoughts On the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV.
481, 489 (1983).
77. Id. at 490.
78. Ryan, Utility and Ownership, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 175, 181 (R. Frey ed. 1984).
79. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 561, 587 (1984). See also Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. EcON. REv. 347, 348 (1976) ("[a] primary function of property rights is that of guiding
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities").
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free use of one's property, particularly for economic profit, there is little
obvious point or justification to invoking a fundamental right.8 0
Property, however, is also justifiable on grounds independent of incen-
tives. Charles Reich has classically noted that "property performs the func-
tion of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creat-
ing zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner." 8 The mere
assertion of eminent domain rises no higher than the assertion of a mere
legislative majority. Reich goes on to insist, with implications for our iden-
tity-constitutive property rights, that "there must be a zone of privacy for
each individual beyond which neither government nor private power can
push-a hiding place from the all-pervasive system of regulation and
control."82
It has similarly been argued that private property rights must reflect
each individual's "capacity to shape and pursue his or her own conception
of a meaningful life." 83 More concretely, "[tihe properties a person owns
are his way of controlling and shaping nature in order to develop, affect,
and express his own character and his ways of living and working."" Of
course, taken broadly and literally, these principles would prove too much
in establishing a fundamental right to property; the choice of brick over
wood in selecting a residence may ordinarily reflect one's tastes and person-
ality,8 5 but at a level too superficial to constitute a choice embodying the
exercise of a fundamental property right.
This is not to suggest that courts must rely solely on a general theory
and their own intuitions in determining the scope of fundamental property
rights, although the examples cited throughout this Article seem obvious
80. See Kelso, Substantive Due Process As a Limit On Police Power Regulatory Tak-
ings, 20 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1, 33 & 33 n.140 (1984) (criticizing Morgan & Shonkwiler,
Regulatory Takings in Oregon: A Walk Down Fifth Avenue Without Due Process, 16 WIL-
LAMETTE L. REV. 591, 632 (1980)).
81. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964). See also Pennock,
Thoughts on the Right to Private Property, in XXII NoMos: PROPERTY 177 (J. Pennock & J.
Chapman eds. 1980) (identity and dignity).
82. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964).
83. Sartorius, Persons and Property, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 196, 196 (R. Frey ed.
1984).
84. Stillman, Property, Freedom and Individuality in Political Thought, in XXII No-
MOS: PROPERTY 138 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980). See also Perry, The Importance
of Being Identical, in THE IDENTITIES OF PERSONS 89 (A. Rorty ed. 1976) ("long-range com-
mitments and projects" as "the source of the continuity of character and personality and val-
ues that constitute integration"); Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, in id. at 209
("ground" project or projects as significantly giving meaning to one's life). Of course, even
one's "ground" projects are subject to (voluntary) reassessment. See Taylor, Responsibility
For Self, in id. at 296.
85. See Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in XXII NoMos: PROPERTY 77 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980).
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enough. Beyond subjective testimony, and such proxies as length of family
or individual ownership, courts would normally agree that multiple owner-
ship--diffusely held corporate stock, as opposed to a closely-held corpora-
tion or sole proprietorship--would be among the relevant factors. As
Charles Reich has pointed out, "[mlultiple ownership of corporations
helped to separate personality from property. .... 86
Similarly, while mere residence property without more does not qualify
for fundamental right status, it is clear that in the "loose hierarchy" of
property interests, undeveloped land held for speculative investment tends
to be less central to individual identity and life-meaning than actively used
residential property.8 7
Having directly worked on something oneself is obviously also impor-
tant, though this should not be thought to cut generally in favor of a pre-
ferred status for tangible property. "[I]ntangible property, if it is in the
form of, say, shares of stock, may possibly be psychologically less close than
one's car, while the same might not be true of an original idea8 8 or an
artistic creation."89 The nature and quality of the relationship between
property and owner is obviously only dimly reflected at best by the tangible
versus intangible property dimension.
VI. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND CURRENT THINKING
ON EMINENT DOMAIN
In an era of greater intellectual discretion, Morris R. Cohen once ob-
served that no one had lapsed into so great a confusion as "to argue that
the state has no right to deprive an individual of property to which he is so
attached that he refuses any money for it." 90 While this Article has perhaps
taken some issue with Cohen's view, it is clear that in recent times, the
Supreme Court has endorsed the strongest possible version of the Cohen
view.
As of 1954, the Court could be said to have erased the otherwise cru-
86. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 772 (1964).
87. See Sager, Property Rights and the Constitution, in XXII NoMos: PROPERTY 378
(J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980).
88. While it is fair to suggest that raw ideas are not typically condemned, they may be
and are condemned when in the form of, for example, trade secrets. See Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011-14 (1984). A perhaps even better known case of the condemna-
tion of intangible property would be City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 646
P.2d 835, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982) (en banc).
89. Pennock, Thoughts on the Right to Private Property, in XXII NoMos: PRIVATE
PROPERTY 180 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980). But cf. Costonis, Presumptive and Per
Se Takings: A Decisional Model For the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 465, 514 (1983)
(emphasizing particularly the psychological attraction of tangible property).
90. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 24 (1927).
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cial requirement of a showing of a legitimate public use for the taking.91
What was left remaining of a public use requirement is said to have been
abolished as of 1984.92 The result is said to "threaten to lay private prop-
erty open to wholesale public acquisition limited, if at all, only by the avail-
ability of public funds to pay compensation for the taking."9
Yet the scholarly focus, both historically 94 and currently95 has been not
on preventing unjust condemnations, or even the tightening of the public
use requirement, but on issues of compensation vel non or fair levels of
compensation. The focus has been on compensation and compensation is-
sues despite the obvious national concern for the "preservation" of property
rights." One does not preserve a right by setting a price on its destruction.
This tendency is partially explainable by the sheer practical salience of
cases of total or partial economic loss because of regulation or condemna-
tion. 97 Even the largest merely pecuniary losses are amenable in principle to
compensation. More deeply, though, there is the modern utilitarian or
wealth maximizing tendency to see only a mere quantitative or degree-of-
intensity-of-preference difference between mere pecuniary loss or the bur-
91. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Note, Public Use, Private Use, and
Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 409, 423 (1983). See also Stoebuck,
A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 560-61 (1972).
92. See Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Callies, A Re-
quiem for Public Purpose, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND
EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.02 (J. Moss ed. 1985). Ellen Frankel Paul has qualified as a moderate
on the issue by referring to the public use requirement after Midkiffas "all but buried." Paul,
Public Use: A Vanishing Limitation On Governmental Takings, 4 CATO J. 835, 835 (1985).
93. Callies, A Requiem for Public Purpose, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON
PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.0214], at 8-15 (J. Moss ed. 1985).
At the state level, condemnation is restricted not only by state constitutional provisions,
but by the fourteenth amendment due process clause, even though the latter of course contains
no literal takings or just compensation clause. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897). The Supreme Court has apparently never reversed a state court
finding that a particular use was public. See Sackman, Public Use-Updated (City of Oak-
land v. Oakland Raiders), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND
EMINENT DOMAIN 203, 207 (M. Landwehr ed. 1983). At least some state courts have pre-
served some of the substance of a public use requirement. See, e.g., Merrill v. City of
Manchester, 499 A.2d 216 (N.H. 1985); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d
451 (Fla. 1975); Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978). See also
Note, Containing the Effect of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff On Takings For Private
Industry, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 428, 444 (1986).
94. See, e.g., Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain,
6 WIs. L. REV. 67 (1931).
95. See, e.g., Oakes, "'Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH.
L. REV. 583, 621 (1981).
96. See Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 708 (1985).
97. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150 n.5
(1971); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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dens of unexpected inconvenience and what we have referred to as identity-
disruptive takings, if the latter category is even imagined.
As a result, even when property rights are addressed in an eminent
domain context, they are conceived of as rather colorless, fragile constructs:
When there is such public need, "[tihe abstract right [of an in-
dividual] to make use of his own property in his own way is
compelled to yield to the general comfort and protection of com-
munity, and to a proper regard to relative rights in others." 9
Individual property rights on this analysis are pejoratively characterized as"'abstract," balanced off against unspecified "rights" of others, and held to
pale before some public good. Pitched in the extraordinarily general and
sweeping terms of a broad asserted right to do precisely what one wishes
with one's property, the right to property is without much force or
substance.
An essentially economic or compensation-oriented approach, however,
does not do justice to the historical concern in the eminent domain context
for the control of arbitrary or tyrannical power.'9 Such an approach cannot
explain why citizens, or hypothetical or actual contractors, would care
about arbitrariness or tyranny only in the context of compensation, and not
in the context of whether property should, in a given case, be taken at all
for use that is admittedly public, or approved by a majority. Such an ap-
proach to the takings clause fails to recognize the clause adequately as "a
bulwark against unfairness, rather than against mere value diminution."' 00
This is not to deny that there is some limited potential for compensa-
tion reform in our context. Requiring the condemnor to pay some premium
above fair market value' 0 ' obviously tends to marginally diminish the num-
ber of takings, and tends to capture some consumers' surplus for the prop-
erty owner, but it has no obvious tendency to deter specially the most egre-
gious takings.
Similarly, while it may be attractive to ask the condemnor to bear or
account for certain "demoralization costs,"'0 2 or the social costs attributa-
98. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 633-34, 304
N.W.2d 455, 459 (1981) (quoting nineteenth century Michigan authority) (brackets inserted
in Poletown opinion).
99. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 57 (1964).
100. Id.
101. See Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203,
244-45 (1978).
102. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-16 (1967). Michelman
discusses the possibility of a "personality"-based approach, but only in the context of compen-
sation issues. See id. at 1205.
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ble to public perceptions of a taking as unfair, threatening, or disruptive,
even this limited measure is not unproblematic. Circularity threatens,
clearly, if the court's own assessment of the fairness of the taking is indi-
rectly or ultimately taken into account by the public in evaluating the fair-
ness of the taking. Yet for the judge to know whether a particular taking is
fair or not, she must know, among other things, the public's reaction.
If compensation-based approaches are largely unavailing in the context
of identity-constitutive property, there is of course the obvious possibility of
seeking to resuscitate the public use requirement. There is first the literalist
approach of interpreting "public use" as "use by the public,"10 even if fa-
cilities could be of great public benefit without being used by the public,
and even if private facilities could be open to the public. The logic of this
approach is that "if . . . private property may be taken for any purpose of
public benefit and utility, what limit is there to the power of the
legislative?' 0 4 .
One might as well opt for the restrictive view that the taking must be
necessary in order to effectuate the public purpose sought to be effectu-
ated. 0 5 On this view, the practical availability of other routes to the same
end, perhaps including less burdensome condemnations, must be exhausted
first.
From the standpoint of this Article, though, reinvigorated public use
approaches, by themselves, are deficient in that they are insensitive to the
possibility of identity-constitutive property being condemned, in the absence
of or despite other alternatives, for public uses or purposes that may in fact
be rather trivial, but that happen to fit within the narrowly-defined category
of public uses. A lighthouse may be a classic "public good," and a legiti-
mate public use on anyone's theory. There may be no other way to ensure
the performance of the lighthouse's function than through a condemnation
of identity-constitutive property. But what if the lighthouse will be of only
modest actual public benefit?' 0 6 It is therefore improper to imagine that "if
103. See, e.g., J. LEWIS, I A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 165, at
417 (2d ed. 1900).
104. Id. at 418. Some sort of reinvigoration of the public use clause has been called for
regularly, up through Comment, Eminent Domain, The Police Power, and the Fifth Amend-
ment: Defining the Domain of the Takings Analysis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 514-15 (1986).
105. See, e.g., Meidinger, The "'Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy,
II ENVTL. L. 1, 45 (1980); Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected
Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 763 (1986).
106. In his wide-ranging and intellectually provocative recent book, Professor Richard
Epstein is more inclined to attempt to solve eminent domain problems through interpreting"public use" through the economic concept of public goods than to take note of the possibility
of plainly vital property interests being sacrificed for inconsequential, but narrowly public, uses
or goods. See generally R. EPSTEIN. TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN (1985). See also Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 286 n.30 (1986)
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courts required that takings actually be for a public use, private property
owners would realize adequate protection of their interests."'10 7
Some courts and commentators have begun the process of approaching
a recognition of a fundamental property right by engaging in some sort of
balancing process. Thus one court has determined that "if the social costs
exceed the probable benefits, then the project cannot be said to be built for
a public use." 108 This view is of course a bit counter-intuitive in that no
matter what counts as a cost or benefit, we do not know whether a light-
house or a public highway connecting two cities is a public use until we
know the social price to be paid.
If one wants to ask, however, whether "the condemnor's need for the
taking outweigh[s] the harm to be visited upon the condemnee,"'' 0 9 the ma-
jor practical decisions to be made are not just what kinds of things count as
costs or harms, but whether any sorts of harms should qualify as harms of
special importance, incomensurable with other sorts of (chiefly pecuniary)
harms."10 This Article has argued that the substantial impairment or dis-
ruption of identity in basic respects falls into this category.
There are at least occasional expressions of sympathy for an even more
("none of [Epstein's] proposals would stymie industrial development, as contrasted with the
absolute bars he imposes on welfare-type redistribution"); Note, Richard Epstein on the Foun-
dations of Takings Jurisprudence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 791 (1986).
107. Note, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: A Final Requiem For the Public Use
Limitation on Eminent Domain, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 388, 399 n.100 (1985).
A final way of providing some substance to the public use requirement involves manipula-
tion of the concepts of direct versus indirect benefit to the public, or primary versus incidental
benefit, or the detection by the judiciary of legislative purposes in conflict with those asserted
to justify the taking. The result can sometimes be a sort of rough justice of an intellectually
unsatisfying sort. See, e.g., Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216 (N.H. 1985).
108. Merrill v. City of Manchester, 499 A.2d 216, 217 (N.H. 1985). See also Baker,
Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 764
(1986).
109. Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203,
223-24 (1978).
110. Lawrence Berger, the author of the quoted balancing formula, ultimately concludes
that "it would be only the more frivolous and arbitrary public takings that this rule would
forbid." Id. at 243. An at least apparently more stringent test requires that the taking be the
"most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury." Meidinger, The
"Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENVTL. L. 1, 45 (1980) (quoting
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-9906 (1964)). This test in itself gives no hint of how to proceed
if greater public benefit can be purchased only at the cost of greater private injury, and does
not develop the concept of private injury.
Some writers occasionally show interest in the values served by property rights in the
eminent domain context. Frank Michelman, for example, has picked out the value of expres-
sive and effective participation in the political order. See Michelman, Property as a Constitu-
tional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1113 (1981). Michelman does not elevate any
property interest to fundamental right status on this account.
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restrictive approach to takings. One writer has argued, in part on the basis
of the view that the right of the state can rise no higher than the additive
sum of the individual rights that persons separately might bestow on the
state, that the exercise of eminent domain can be justified "only in excep-
tional cases.""' This rule would of course bar important condemnation
projects on the basis of the merely arbitrary willfulness of the landowner.
It has similarly been argued that "any overriding of an existing prop-
erty right must either be with the rightholder's consent or else be accompa-
nied by just compensation. In consequence, where just compensation is im-
possible, and consent cannot be obtained, no overriding of the right is
justifiable."'"12
In some cases, it may be that the level of just compensation is not
ascertainable for technical reasons, even in the absence of significant values
on the condemnee's side of the ledger. The appeal of this standard may
depend upon whether it is felt to be impossible to justly compensate for a
variety of significant and less significant, but real, psychological and emo-
tional losses associated with many routine condemnations. The standard, as
formulated, is of course also insensitive to the possibility of a genuinely
compelling state interest susceptible of effectuation in no way other than
through the particular condemnation.
VII. FINAL OBJECTIONS
Is it possible to reasonably contain the fundamental right to property,
in a principled way, within the fields of eminent domain and the most ex-
treme sorts of regulation? It might be thought that the view argued for here
implicates even general, broad-based taxes."' Of course, while taxation
promises no immediate, direct, personal compensation, it is crucial to re-
member that taxes can essentially be paid, generally, out of the property to
which one is least attached. Merely writing a check, however painful, is not,
in the typical taxation case, disruptive of identity.
It has been pointed out, however, that while we may be in some sense
inseparable from some of our property, we clearly do not have such a
profound relationship with all of our property. It will therefore be difficult
for the government to predict in advance whether a particular taking will
have an identity-disruptive effect. Therefore, eminent domain is an awk-
I II. Pilon, Property Rights, Takings, and a Free Society, 6 HARV. J. L. & Pua. POL'Y.
165, 186 (1983). As against Pilon's rationale, it may be reasonable, for example, that a soci-
ety, collectively, have a right that a given person be reasonably charitable, generally, even if no
particular individual person has a right to be the recipient of that person's charity.
112. L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (1977).
113. Cf. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 596-
97 (1972).
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ward, almost useless tool for the tyranny of a malignant government.
Therefore, it is said, our concern is at best overdrawn."'
One suspects that eminent domain need not be so blunt and ineffective
an instrument, but that is hardly the main point. Briefly, government mal-
ice or tyranny is not the issue. If it were, most tyrannous takings could be
blocked by the free speech, free press, and free exercise of religion clauses.
What is to be feared in the main is ignorance, arbitrariness, insensitivity, or
casual indifference on the part of a condemnor who is willing and able to
pay. Wilful state oppression is obviously not the only possible cause of the
severe deadweight losses of basic identity discussed throughout this Article.
Finally, it has been argued that there may be more subtle reasons why
property is not protected, even in the most obvious instances, by rules along
the lines suggested in this Article. Professor Radin has explicitly raised the
possibility of deep protection for some property interests, without in the end
endorsing or arguing for a fundamental right approach." 5 This may be
partly because of the influence of her own terminology; the category of"personal," as opposed to "fungible," property seems too broadly encom-
passing to plausibly support a fundamental right.11 Why construct a funda-
mental right to protect things like one's toothbrush?
In the course of her very useful analysis, Radin considers that our con-
cerns may be outweighed by "the government's need to appear even-handed
and the lower administrative costs associated with simpler rules. ' ' 1 This
problem can be dealt with in part, as noted above, 1 through the use of
objective, often document-based, proxies for the more ineffable qualities
and relationships underlying our concern.
The more important response, though, is that even-handedness in this
context means even-handedness, or equal governmental indifference, as be-
tween substantial disruption of condemnee identity and no such disruption
at all. A consistently applied fundamental right rule is defensible as sub-
stantively even-handed, as opposed to being merely formally, even-handed.
Radin then suggests, however, that we simply tend to assume or expect
that condemnors "will take fungible property where possible."119 While it is
sensible to suppose that malice is not the governmental norm, and while it
is posible that there is some sort of correlation between fair market value of
a property and the likelihood that it is of identity-constitutive character,
Radin's perceived social assumption may be falsified by cases of govern-
114. Id. at 597.
115. See Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 1014-15 (1982).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1006.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 31.
119. Radin, supra note 115, at 1006.
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mental casual indifference. Elected officials need not fear substantial losses
of votes or contributions because of the condemnation of one or a few per-
sons' property.
Ultimately, we may expect the government to take fungible property in
about the same sense in which we expect government officials not to negli-
gently inflict personal or property-damage injury on citizens. We expect
government officials to exercise reasonable care, but we are not surprised,
and we ordinarily provide appropriate legal redress, when they do not.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Definitively accounting for the absence of any fundamental right to
property is of course impossible as long as the range of potential goals that
a law to the contrary might be thought to serve is broad enough.12 0 There is
a sense, though, that at least some of the support for what often amounts to
an apparently mysterious disregard of basic individual interests is merely
inertial and historically residual. It is doubtless true that at a time when the
very life of the community depended upon the most advantageous use of
every resource that could be availed of, it was not to be expected that over-
refined scruples with respect to the rights of private property would be al-
lowed to stand in the way or that an individual who held his own title from
a colonial grant would be allowed to use that self-same title to thwart the
efforts of others to keep the colony alive."'Today, however, such social
emergencies are both rare and easily recognized as compelling state inter-
ests, and we are less inclined to view all property ownership as a matter of
collective largesse. The historical roots of a fundamental right to property
are plain, and the contemporary justification clear and unambiguous.
120. Hans Linde has noted
identification of the goals of a law offers wide choice between the past assumptions of a
policy and its present justifications, between actual and merely hypothetical goals, be-
tween immediate objectives and larger social aims, between a series of separate goals or a
single accomodation of competing interests, and between the statements of legislators,
executive officers, or state courts.
Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 215 (1976).
121. Sackman, Public Use-Updated (City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders), in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 203, 209 (M.
Landwehr ed. 1983).
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